Service identity & mTLS
P58.service-to-service.01 · Audience: guest, it-ml, language-pro · Prerequisites: The TLS 1.3 handshake, Zero trust: never trust the network
Ordinary TLS (P53) proves the server's identity to the client. Between services that is only half of what you need: the server must also know which workload is calling. With one-sided authentication, any client that can reach the service — a compromised pod, a stray script — is accepted at the transport layer.
mTLS closes it: both sides present a certificate, both validate the other's, and only then is a session established. This module builds that state machine, deriving the session key with HMAC (ties P52) once — and only once — both sides have proven themselves.
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Rung 1 — mutual TLS: both sides prove it
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Later in Service to Service